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Mindful in Westminster
The politics of meditation and the limits of 
neoliberal critique
Joanna Cook, University College London 
Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the relationship between 
forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market forces. But how do we decipher 
its limits? Taking political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus, I explore 
theoretical categories of neoliberalism and “responsibilization” that cross-cut emerging 
forms of governance in contemporary British society. I chose this particular ethnographic 
focus in order to examine the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification 
practices, and the ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of political 
inquiry. I argue that practices of subjectification are never totalizing, that politico-economic 
concerns remain central to professional interest in self-governance, that subjectification 
practices may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings, and that the maintenance of this 
multiplicity is a motor of political process. 
Keywords: mindfulness, neoliberalism, governance, mental health, subjectification, 
responsiblization, meditation
Identifying the limits of neoliberalism 
The concept of neoliberalism has been central to social scientific analyses of the 
relationship between changing forms of state responsibility, socioeconomic or-
ganization, and forms of reflexive self-governance. “Neoliberalism” is used to ac-
count for the development of a more technocratic and managerial role for the state 
(Gledhill 2004; Ferguson 2006) based on a belief in the justice of the market lead-
ing to deregulation, flexible working, the liberalization of capital, the reduction of 
the state, and restrictions on public spending. This is sometimes characterized as 
a move away from a theory of social welfare as the responsibility of government 
through a reinterpretation of the governability of subjects (Rose 1999a, 1999b). 
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Risk and uncertainty increase as a result of changing socioeconomic structures at 
the same time as technologies of “responsibilization” proliferate (Rose 1996a, 2001, 
2007; Shamir 2008), by which state involvement in social welfare is reduced and 
replaced with groups and individuals who are encouraged to “take responsibility” 
for self-governance and decision making (Bennett 2008). Sennett suggests that un-
der such conditions individuals must dwell “in a continual state of vulnerability” 
(1998: 83; see also 2006). Writing of flexible corporate practice, he argues that peo-
ple are driven to achieve, but the institutional structures by which this might occur 
are left open and flexible. The economic necessity to pursue multiple possibilities 
and the capacity to adapt to volatile and changeable demands requires a particular 
strength of character, “that of someone who has the confidence to dwell in disorder, 
someone who flourishes in the midst of dislocation” (Sennett 1998: 62). Sennett 
argues that the freedom of the flexible capitalist is amoral, and that the demands 
of spontaneity and flexibility can be self-destructive.1 The individual is responsible 
for maximizing her emotional capital, and needs to protect herself in a condition of 
endemic uncertainty. The management of risk, engagement, and response becomes 
the responsibility of the individual (Beck 1992). With the diminution of the events 
and conditions that influence experience (the “happ” of happiness), experience 
must be privately created. Resilience and flexibility are required in an environment 
of uncertainty and risk, in which institutional supports have been rescinded to the 
capricious demands of consumer capitalism. 
Drawing on Foucauldian theory, Rose has analyzed neoliberalism as a practice 
of governance for the minimization of costs and maximization of profits, as “a ‘way 
of doing’ directed towards objectives and regulating itself through continuous re-
flection” (Foucault 2008: 318). He argues that neoliberal governance is achieved 
through techniques that encourage subjects to take responsibility for their decision 
making and subject formation (Rose 1999a). Neoliberal governance is understood 
to be based on processes of “subjectivation”—identity-forming processes by which 
the subject is constituted. The state and professional organizations assume the role 
of managing populations for optimal productivity, while subjects take responsibil-
ity for their own self-governance. These processes of self-governance lead subjects 
to act in ways that reinforce their subjection (Rose 1996b). Under this transformed 
understanding of governance and responsibility, the subject is “free” to make choic-
es concerning her own welfare, guided by the management of an “empowering” 
state. Such responsibility is meted out to all subjects irrespective of the structural or 
socioeconomic factors that might impinge on any form of decision making (Rose 
1999b; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Ong 2006). The neoliberal subject becomes “an 
entrepreneur of himself ” (Foucault 2010: 226), and work upon the self becomes an 
investment in capital. Gershon characterizes this as “a self that is a flexible bundle 
of skills that reflexively manages oneself as though the self was a business” (2011: 
537).2 Governing individual dispositions, emotions, and motivations then becomes 
1. Similarly, Bauman (2007) has argued that social forms and institutions no longer act as 
frames of reference, and individuals learn to be flexible and adaptable under conditions 
of unending precarity.
2. For Gershon, neoliberal agency creates relationships that are morally lacking and over-
looks differences in scale.
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an individual responsibility and the site of governmental focus, structured by eco-
nomic interests and market logic (Rose 1996a, 1996b). Individuals become produc-
tive members of society, not only through their labour, but also through the labour 
to shape themselves as such. The subject has to be educated (“made up,” in Rose 
and Miller’s terms [1992]) through techniques that enable her to take herself as a 
project, as if she were her own entrepreneur. 
Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the relation-
ship between forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market forces. 
But how do we decipher its limits? Are there forms of governance and reflexive 
self-governance that are not accounted for by a focus on neoliberal “entrepre-
neurialism”? As Hilgers asks, “Should we regard any mode of government that 
adopts a principle of optimisation, sometimes in a single domain, as neoliberal?” 
(2010: 360). In this contribution, I consider the limits of neoliberalism through 
an ethnographic focus on political interest in mindfulness-based interventions in 
civil society. In the United Kingdom, mindfulness is a political concern. Mind-
fulness meditation, an awareness practice which originated in Buddhism, is be-
ing interpreted as a positive intervention for societal problems as wide ranging 
as depressive relapse, criminal recidivism, children’s academic performance, and 
worker burnout. It is believed to help practitioners cope with life (from stress, 
anxiety, and depression to impulse control, emotional regulation, and intellec-
tual flexibility) and is now taught in major civil society institutions in the United 
Kingdom, including hospitals, prisons, schools, and private businesses. In 2014, 
an All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) was established in Westminster, com-
mitted to investigating the ways in which public policy might incorporate mind-
fulness-based practices. From May–December 2014, eight parliamentary hear-
ings of the Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG) were held in 
Westminster, each focusing on a different area of public life. An inquiry report 
was drafted by the supporting secretariat outlining key policy recommendations 
for funding, implementation, and research, and this was launched in Parliament 
in October 2015. 
As a focus of public policy, is mindfulness training placed in the service of neo-
liberal governance? Through an ethnographic consideration of parliamentary hear-
ings on mindfulness, participant observation with the secretariat (the Mindfulness 
Initiative), interviews with members, and analysis of the final policy document, 
Mindful Nation UK, I examine the ways in which issues of self-governance and re-
sponsibility were motivated, debated, and framed. In the following, I argue that an 
analysis of political interest in mindfulness as “neoliberalism” frames subjectifica-
tion as making people totally responsible for their mental health, detached from a 
broader socioeconomic and structural context. This is not borne out ethnographi-
cally. Furthermore, I argue that an analysis of self-governance as neoliberalism as-
sumes that practices of subjectification are always already in the service of neolib-
eralism. Rather than offering either a critique of, or an apology for, mindfulness, I 
take political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus in order to examine 
the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification practices, and the 
ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of political inquiry. 
Mindfulness as a political focus is being framed in multiple ways simultaneously, 
many of which lie beyond the limits of the analytic framework of neoliberalism. I 
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argue that the political value of the inquiry process rested on the maintenance of 
multiplicity in the meanings and values of self-governance. 
Mindfulness in Parliament and the establishment of the APPG
Mindfulness, as it is now found in British workplaces, education, healthcare, and 
criminal justice, originated in Buddhist meditation. It gained legitimacy as a secu-
lar and therapeutic practice following the development of mindfulness-based stress 
reduction in the 1970s and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy in the 1990s, and 
subsequent scientific research into their efficacy. Beginning in the 1950s in South-
east Asia, reformist monks developed, reinvigorated, and propagated a form of med-
itation, vipassanā, based on a Buddhist text, The Mahāsatipatthāna Sutta (see Jordt 
2007; Cook 2010; Braun 2013). The propagation of vipassanā was presented as a move 
away from “esoteric” meditative practices toward a more “rational” and “authentic” 
practice for salvation, available to monastics and laity (Van Esterik 1977). Mindful-
ness (Pali: sati) was understood to be an ethically positive perspectival awareness, 
which could be cultivated through meditative discipline, requiring morality, con-
centration, and wisdom. In the 1970s, Jon Kabat-Zinn developed mindfulness-based 
stress reduction (MBSR), at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, origi-
nally to address chronic pain and a range of conditions that were difficult to treat 
(Kabat-Zinn 1990).3 He interpreted mindfulness as a universal human capacity that 
could be developed by patients in order to alleviate suffering. In his foreword to the 
APPG Inquiry Report, Mindful Nation UK, he writes that mindfulness— 
being about attention, awareness, relationality, and caring—is a universal 
capacity, akin to our capacity for language acquisition. While the most 
systematic and comprehensive articulation of mindfulness and its related 
attributes stems from the Buddhist tradition, mindfulness is not a 
catechism, an ideology, a belief system, a technique or set of techniques, 
a religion, or a philosophy. It is best described as “a way of being.” 
(Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group UK 2015: 5)
In his development of MBSR, Kabat-Zinn sought to routinize mindfulness in tar-
geted interventions in order to address the suffering of ill health in pragmatic ways. 
Drawing inspiration from MBSR, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) 
was developed in 1991 by Zindel Segal, Mark Williams, and John Teasdale in Cam-
bridge, England, as a psychosocial intervention for the prevention of depressive 
relapse (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013). In the cognitive framework for de-
pressive relapse, suffering was interpreted as resulting from the ways in which pa-
tients related to experiences, rather than the experiences themselves. As such, if 
patients could learn to relate to experience differently, they would suffer less. Thus, 
3. Earlier movements had sought to explore the benefits of dialogue between psychology 
and Buddhist and meditative practice (for a history of the dialogue between Buddhism 
and psychology in America, see Metcalf 2002; on the relationship between psychology 
and Zen Buddhism, see Fromm, Suzuki and De Martino 1970; on the psychological 
framing of Transcendental Meditation, see Williamson 2010).
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the cognitive framework of MBCT rests on the premises that there is a cognitive 
component to depressive relapse and that people have the capacity to learn ways 
of relating to their thoughts and feelings that will enable them to maintain mental 
and emotional balance, even in the face of challenging experiences. MBCT was 
found to reduce depressive relapse in three randomized-controlled trials (RCTs) 
(Teasdale et al. 2000; Ma and Teasdale 2004; Kuyken et al. 2008), following which it 
received recommendation from the National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence (NICE) and was mandated on the National Health Service (NHS) for people 
who had experienced three or more depressive episodes, but who were currently 
well. The contemporary interest in mindfulness results, in part, from an increasing 
evidence base for mindfulness-based interventions and their subsequent uptake.4 
Despite the findings of the RCTs and the NICE recommendation, MBCT re-
mained widely inaccessible across the NHS. One of its developers, Mark Williams, 
proposed the introduction of mindfulness courses for politicians in Westminster 
in order to bring MBCT to their attention. As one of the chairs of the APPG com-
mented, he “decided the only way to get the policy establishment really engaging 
with mindfulness was to take it to them.” Williams collaborated in an in-Parliament 
initiative led by Richard Layard, an economist and life peer in the House of Lords, 
and Chris Ruane, then a Labour MP,5 to establish mindfulness courses for parlia-
mentarians. To date, 130 parliamentarians and 220 staff have completed an adapted 
MBCT course in Westminster. The course is taught in groups of eight to twelve 
led by a trained therapist, over an eight-week period. The most commonly used 
definition of mindfulness in this context is “the awareness that emerges through 
paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgementally, to 
things as they are” (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013: 132). The group meets once 
a week for two and a half hours. Aspects that are taught in the course include at-
tentional control (mindfulness) cognitive skills (decentering, observational capac-
ity), and behavioral skills (developing active/movement body-based skills) (ibid.). 
The course is built up of a series of intentional exercises, including mindfulness of 
breath, mindful movement, a body scan, mindful eating, as well as intentionally 
bringing an attitude of kindly awareness to everyday activities such as doing the 
washing up, eating, or bathing. Each session is followed by “homework”—guid-
ed mindfulness practices which participants listen to at home, bringing mindful 
awareness to specified routine activities, and pleasant and unpleasant events calen-
dars; in the penultimate week, participants also complete an action plan. 
In a presentation to the London Buddhist Society, one of the key nonparliamen-
tary members of the APPG commented, “The thing about politicians is once they 
get the taste of something they want to do something. And this is an important point 
actually, because the doing has a sort of driving momentum.” Politicians who had 
4. There is increasing evidence that MBCT might help large numbers of people experi-
encing depressive affect and patterns of recurring depression (cf. Baer 2003; Coelho, 
Canter, and Ernst 2007). Kuyken et al. (2008) demonstrate that MBCT is equivalent to 
maintenance antidepressants for the prevention of depressive relapse but is superior in 
terms of quality of life and residual depressive symptoms.
5. Chris Ruane was the member of Parliament for the Vale of Clwyd. He lost his seat in the 
General Election of May 2015. 
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completed a mindfulness course sought to establish an APPG to identify problem-
atic issues that were being faced in four areas of civil society—the criminal justice 
system, the national curriculum, the NHS, and the workplace—and the potential for 
mindfulness-based interventions to address them. APPGs are informal cross-party 
groups brought together to develop policy recommendations for government on 
subjects for which there is cross-party interest. Nominally run by members of the 
Commons and Lords, the secretariat is provided by individuals and organizations 
from outside Parliament. The APPG was supported by the Mindfulness Initiative, 
an advocacy/“secretariat” group comprised of professionals from a range of areas, 
drawn together by their professional and personal commitment to mindfulness. 
These included a senior journalist, the directors of Bangor and Oxford University 
Mindfulness Centres, the founder of the Mindfulness in Schools Project, the clinical 
lead for an NHS trust, and a senior economist and peer. Associates of the Mindful-
ness Initiative included a director of the Royal Society of Arts, a director from the 
corporate sector, experts in mindfulness and the criminal justice system, clinical 
psychologists, the chief operating officer of an educational trust, and others. The 
mission of the APPG was set out as providing a forum for discussion in Parliament 
about the role of mindfulness in public policy, promoting mindfulness in tackling a 
range of critical challenges that the government faced, advocating for more research 
to strengthen the existing evidence base, and showcasing best practice. 
In May 2014, the APPG was launched in Parliament in an atmosphere of an-
ticipation. In a large meeting room in Westminster, there was standing room only 
as approximately three hundred people, including thirty members of Parliament 
(MPs), crowded in attendance. Professor Willem Kuyken, a cognitive psychologist 
and the director of the Oxford Mindfulness Centre, described the meeting as “a 
wow moment,” and a palpable sense of excitement filled the room. After the launch, 
eighteen people came forward to the organizers and asked how they could help. As 
one of the organizers said later, “They covered such a wide range of skills and back-
grounds . . . this is 80 percent volunteer effort.” From May–December 2014, eight 
parliamentary hearings of the APPG were held in Westminster, each focusing on a 
different area of public life. These were: mindfulness in the workplace; mindfulness 
and mental health; mindfulness in the criminal justice system; mindfulness and 
physical pain and mindfulness for NHS staff; mindfulness in education; mindful-
ness in the workplace II; mindfulness and policing; and mindfulness and gangs. 
Following the inquiry period, a report was written by the Mindfulness Initiative 
on behalf of the MPs who had chaired the inquiry. The report was launched in 
Parliament in October 2015. It outlined the character and scale of the challenges 
identified in health, education, the workplace, and the criminal justice system, and 
the existing evidence for mindfulness-based interventions. It called for targeted 
interventions in each area and funding for further research.6 Each section of the re-
port was written by two or three members of the Mindfulness Initiative, and these 
sections were then edited into a single document by two editors. The contributions 
of each of these people were smoothed into a single voice and there are no authors 
named in the final document. 
6. The report can be viewed online (see Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group 
2015).
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Mindful neoliberals? 
Over the period of the inquiry process, public interest in mindfulness reached un-
precedented heights and mindfulness made frequent appearances in the media. 
The primary academic analysis of the popularity of secular mindfulness practice 
has been that it is a neoliberal tool: it has been analyzed as reflecting changing 
frameworks of state responsibility and an increasing emphasis on the “responsibil-
ity” of subjects to self-manage at a time of increasing privatization. It has enabled 
governance at a distance by making people responsible for their own mental health. 
For example, Purser and Loy (2013) write of recent interest in mindfulness,
There is a dissociation between one’s own personal transformation and the 
kind of social and organizational transformation that takes into account 
the causes and conditions of suffering in the broader environment. 
Such a colonization of mindfulness also has an instrumentalizing effect, 
reorienting the practice to the needs of the market, rather than to a 
critical reflection on the causes of our collective suffering.
Žižek (2001) has gone further and proclaimed that “Western Buddhism . . . is estab-
lishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism.” He argues that a “west-
ern Buddhism meditative stance” functions as an ideological supplement to the 
stress of capitalist dynamics, and is “arguably the most efficient way for us to fully 
participate in capitalist dynamics while retaining the appearance of mental sanity.” 
Such critiques extend into the relationship between “emotional self-optimization” 
and happiness. For example, Binkley (2014) argues that through self-help books, 
spiritual mentoring, business management, and relationship counseling, happiness 
is presented as attainable by everyone, irrespective of their socioeconomic circum-
stances, dispositions, or life experiences, and this leads to a moral responsibility to 
be happy. As he writes, “We are all complicit in our own asphyxiation everyday. We 
do the work of asphyxiation, we call it our freedom, our enterprise, and our hap-
piness. And we should stop” (ibid.: 175). Similarly, Ehrenreich (2009) argues that 
positive thinking has entered a symbiotic relationship with capitalism in America, 
with an emphasis on unending consumption and an imperative for growth. She 
argues that in the United States, happiness is in the service of a rightwing neoliberal 
agenda in which it becomes a moral and a personal responsibility. 
According to such critiques, happiness and wellbeing are psychologized and in-
dividualized, such that they become the responsibility of the individual rather than 
reflective of broader structural, political, or social inequalities that require redress. 
A search for happiness becomes now a self-conscious project of self-improvement 
that can be trained and cultivated, and mindfulness is a means by which this might 
be achieved.7 In the United Kingdom, Davies has argued that the emotions have 
become enslaved to neoliberalism: 
7. In such a reading of mindfulness, the emotionally “fit” are happy. They put their time 
in on the meditation mat, and the result is hedonic buffness. As Nandy puts it, such a 
conceptualization rests on “a self-conscious, determined search for happiness from a 
mental state to an objectified quality of life that can be attained the way an athlete—
after training under a specialist and going through a strict regimen of exercises and 
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Once social relationships can be viewed as medical and biological 
properties of the human body, they can become dragged into the 
limitless pursuit of self optimization that counts for happiness in the age 
of neoliberalism. (2015: 213) 
Davies argues that a focus on happiness as a personal responsibility deflects at-
tention from socioeconomic struggle. It is suggested that individualizing and psy-
chologizing wellbeing or mental health does nothing to address the structural in-
equalities or forms of political disenfranchisement that may lead to the experience 
of negative feelings in the first place. Stress, anxiety, and depression are reframed 
as personal, not political, problems. In a consideration of the micromanagement of 
individuals, he writes: 
If a certain physical context (such as work or poverty) is causing 
pain, one progressive route would involve changing that context. But 
another equivalent would be to focus on changing the way in which it 
is experienced. .  .  . If lifting weights becomes too painful, you’re faced 
with a choice: reduce the size of the weight, or pay less attention to the 
pain. In the early twenty-first century, there is a growing body of experts 
in “resilience” training, mindfulness, and cognitive behavioural therapy 
whose advice is to opt for the latter strategy. (2015: 35) 
While this is a poor account of “resilience” training, mindfulness and cognitive 
behavioral therapy,8 we might make his argument better. It could be argued that 
training in mindfulness is creating exactly the forms of reflexive subjectivity on 
which neoliberalism thrives. Mindfulness is being encouraged in civil society as 
a technique for cultivating a particular reflexive perspective, which fosters intel-
lectual flexibility and emotional resilience. Through repetitive and ongoing train-
ing, practitioners seek to develop a different relationship to thoughts, feelings, 
and bodily sensations. Thus, developing an analysis of mindfulness as a neolib-
eral tool, we could argue that mindfulness not only aligns with neoliberalism, but 
it also provides the motor for it: learning practices of emotional regulation and 
reflexive awareness “responsibilizes” practitioners, who are simultaneously “resil-
ient” enough to remain unaffected by the emotional and psychological effects of 
neoliberal uncertainty and individualism. Suffering becomes the responsibility of 
the individual rather than a result of sociopolitical influences such as class, race, 
gender, or the happenstance of misfortune. Furthermore, individualizing suffering 
silences the possibility of addressing it as a social or a political issue. In such a read-
ing, the current political interest in mindfulness is indicative of broader political 
diet—wins a medal in a track meet” (2012: 45). The implication of this is that unhappi-
ness does not result from external circumstances but is a personal failure.
8. For example, mindfulness practitioners learn to pay more attention to thoughts, feel-
ings, and bodily sensations, not less. Mindfulness-based interventions that address de-
pression and anxiety are premised on the theory that patterns of emotional avoidance 
function to reinforce negative emotional states. Learning to pay attention “in a par-
ticular way, on purpose, in the present moment and non-judgmentally” may alleviate 
suffering because aversive patterns that contribute to emotional distress are reduced 
(Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013).
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shifts in which state responsibility for social welfare has been ceded to technocratic 
managerialism.
The limits of neoliberalism 
Is mindfulness in Parliament a neoliberal tool of “responsibilization” at a time 
when the state is assuming an increasingly managerial role, social welfare provi-
sion is being radically reduced, and significant funding cuts to the NHS are leading 
some to argue that we are witnessing a process of “stealth privatization” (Lacobucci 
2013)? In the following, I will develop an ethnographic argument critiquing such a 
position by demonstrating that subjectification practices are never totalizing, that 
politico-economic concerns remain central to professional interest in self-gover-
nance, that subjectification practices may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings 
(cf. Cruickshank 1999), and that the maintenance of this multiplicity is essential in 
the process of political inquiry. 
Mindfulness practice encourages practitioners to “turn toward” difficulty. It is 
a technique that is explicitly intended to enable a practitioner to relate to herself 
differently, with an attitude of “friendly curiosity” and compassion (Feldman and 
Kuyken 2011). This fits comfortably within a framework of subjectification and 
reflexive self-governance. But, as I will argue, to theorize this as a practice of neo-
liberal “responsibilization” by which the practitioner is made totally responsible for 
her own mental health detached from her socioeconomic and structural context is 
not borne out ethnographically. In part, this theorization rests on an assumption 
that neoliberalism has achieved what is feared, that the subject who learns to “take 
responsibility” for her own wellbeing and happiness does so totally: if we are not 
there yet, then we are on the verge of a Huxleyan dystopia in which “happiness” is 
achieved though the soma of mindfulness. Recognizing the limits of neoliberalism 
moves us away from a conceptualization of neoliberalism as a totalizing ideology 
and allows us to explore the practices of people who recognize collective and struc-
tural causes of suffering at the same time as seeking practices of subjectification for 
improving wellbeing.
Throughout the inquiry process, participants worried over the unhappiness re-
ported in large-scale surveys and the prevalence of mental health issues presented 
in epidemiological statistics, basing their discussions on professional and personal 
experience. In contexts of limited institutional and financial support, many had 
introduced mindfulness courses into their work in an effort to address suffering. 
Speaking with a mental health nurse from Devon, I asked him how he had devel-
oped a mindfulness course at work. 
Well the real challenge is the practical stuff . . . and the culture. At work 
there’s no time and no money. I’m working with patients all day, under 
pressure, there’s never enough time. And I had to work hard to set it up. I 
couldn’t have done it without my supervisor’s support . . . finding a room 
was a nightmare. 
Outside of the hearings, discussion oriented around governmental cuts to fund-
ing, the increasing prevalence of mental health issues presented in epidemiological 
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statistics, and the challenges that speakers had experienced in establishing mind-
fulness courses. For the people involved, mindfulness was not understood as a 
mask for austerity. They understood mindfulness as an intervention that might 
help people deal with stress, anxiety, and depression in contexts of social and po-
litical disenfranchisement. This came as a response to the immediate challenges 
of working with people who face mental health issues during a time of privatiza-
tion and a shrinking state mandate for social welfare. Mental health was framed 
as a major problem in the United Kingdom, and this was, in part, because of the 
increasing risk, inequality, and hardship that people in different populations in the 
country were thought to face. Rather than looking at the macro-level of neoliberal 
forces, which can appear totalizing in their colonization of wellbeing and the re-
sponsibility to self-manage, by exploring the ethnography of political process we 
can account for the concerns and interests of people working in different sectors 
of civil society. The promotion of mindfulness in public policy was an effort to do 
something about the tangible struggles that professionals describe witnessing in 
each of their sectors, given that each sector is undergoing transformation.
The relationship between self-governance and political economy is an impor-
tant one. Governmental emphasis on patient empowerment emerges from chang-
ing relationships between state and citizens, and the role that the state plays in the 
welfare of citizens. It is not a coincidence that austerity and a discourse of “pa-
tient empowerment” are developing simultaneously. But not taking this seriously 
enough casts it as merely a smokescreen for austerity (cf. Howell 2015).9 Encourag-
ing subjects to take responsibility for their mental health is understood as a form of 
governance that “tricks” them into self-governance and effaces political-economic 
relations. Practices of self-governance are interpreted as only individualizing and 
psychologizing suffering, and thereby obfuscating the social or political causes of 
mental health issues at a time of increasing social welfare cuts. Patient empower-
ment, then, becomes a mask for austerity. 
While anthropologists have theorized neoliberalism as a mode of governance 
based on an entrepreneurial model that emphasizes individual risk and responsi-
bility (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), they have noted that it is rarely, if ever, totalizing 
in practice. Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008) consider the limits and challenges 
to theories of neoliberalism highlighted by the implementation of neoliberal poli-
cies. They point to the unevenness of neoliberalism’s spread and the ways in which 
it articulates and intersects with other political-cultural formations and govern-
ing projects. Their aim is “to treat neoliberalism as a process rather than a fait 
accompli” (ibid.: 115; see also Maskovsky and Kingfisher 2001), thereby highlight-
ing the production and reproduction of patterns of inequality, and questioning the 
9. In Howell’s research on psychological resilience in military settings, resilience training 
is understood to optimize military force, and to reduce healthcare costs by preempting 
mental distress in soldiers at a time of shrinking defense expenditure. It is possible to 
interpret this as a form of training by which soldiers are made responsible for their own 
mental health, which has the effect of effacing a politics of austerity in which welfare 
entitlements are shrinking. But Howell argues that this is an insufficient analysis of the 
aims of military resilience programs, which are to enhance (not just to responsibilize) 
soldiers, “a more ambitious aim than responsibilisation” (2015: 69).
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totalizing nature of neoliberalism. In so doing, they are able to provide analyti-
cal space to consider the limits of neoliberalism. Elsewhere, anthropologists have 
demonstrated that local manifestations reveal the limits of neoliberalism and its 
articulation with other cultural, political, and economic forms (see Gledhill 2004; 
Freeman 2007). 
Healthcare policy provides fertile ground for thinking about these limits. Pa-
tients are increasingly encouraged to make decisions for themselves, which are si-
multaneously embedded in broader networks of responsibility and care (Zignon 
2010; Fordyce 2012). Trnka and Trundle (2014) suggest that ideologies of patient 
“empowerment” in which the citizen is imagined as independent and responsible, 
self-managing, and acting in a way that promotes her own health and wellbeing 
may in practice be neither realized nor desired. Forms of identity, collectivity, and 
interpersonal connections may intersect with and contest neoliberal frames. Trnka 
and Trundle argue that “social actors .  .  . move between different moral, ethical, 
and affective valences of what it means to be ‘responsible’ subjects without neces-
sarily feeling conflicted, in need of resolution, or necessitating ‘moral breakdown’” 
(ibid.: 141; see also Zigon 2010). Social relations incorporate multiple framings of 
responsibility, sometimes accounted for through neoliberal logics of self-respon-
sibility and care of the self, and sometimes interpreted in terms of interpersonal 
responsibility and obligation. As Trnka and Trundle argue, “Despite its flexibility, 
neoliberalism cannot encompass the breadth of subjectivities and collective rela-
tions that constitute contemporary enactments of responsibility” (2014: 141) Fur-
thermore, guidelines promoting self-managed care may be interpreted in multiple 
ways, informed by preexisting understandings of responsibility and accountability 
in healthcare (Scheldeman 2008; Trnka 2014). Responsibility has been central to 
a range of anthropological concerns, including: political justice and an equitable 
system (Rawls [1971] 1999; Corsín Jiménez 2008); national identity and kinship 
(Gammeltoff 2007); personal and professional ethics (Brodwin 2013); agency and 
moral blame (Davis 2012); and self-care and decision making (see Mol 2008; Prem-
kumar 2015). A theory of neoliberal “responsibilization” helps to account for the 
ways in which the subject becomes responsible for emotional self-regulation. But if 
the category of “responsiblization” remains limited to the neoliberal framework, it 
becomes hard to account for other forms of responsibility or responsiblization that 
might be in play, or the multiple effects of reflexive self-governance.
The meanings of mindfulness: Maintaining multiplicity
A danger of theorizing practices of subjectification as neoliberal is that they come 
to be read as always already in the service of a neoliberal agenda. If neoliberalism 
has permeated the regulation of the emotions, then there is no room to understand 
attempts to address what are identified as the dehumanizing effects of neoliberal-
ism through practices of subjectification as anything other than more neoliberal-
ism. The way in which the subject relates to herself is both the symptom and the 
cause of neoliberalism: the symptom because anxiety and depression result from 
the uncertainty and individualism of neoliberal structure; and the cause because 
reflexivity and emotional regulation are necessary for neoliberalism to flourish. 
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Not only is neoliberalism a totalizing reality, but also any response to it that entails 
subjectification tightens its colonization of emotional life. As Reveley writes, sub-
jectification is interpreted as “producing a wholly negative, disempowering form of 
strangulating self-entrapment” (2015: 88). 
The political authority of the APPG rested, in part, on the orchestration of 
participants from different social worlds without reducing the diversity of their 
interests and perspectives. Evidence was presented which suggested that mindful-
ness-based interventions might be of benefit for a range of different problems (e.g., 
criminal recidivism, impulse control, emotional regulation, and depressive relapse) 
without reducing them to the same problem, or supposing that mindfulness might 
be helpful for addressing all or some of them for the same reasons. Throughout the 
inquiry process, mindfulness was understood to help practitioners cope with life 
in different ways. Divergent emphases on the meaning of mindfulness reflected 
the heterogeneity of those involved and the diversity of issues under consideration. 
While they were understood to share some characteristics, the differences between 
them remained present. The eight parliamentary hearings focused on a different 
area of civil society, which coalesced beneath four broad headings: health, educa-
tion, criminal justice, and the workplace. In the hearing on mental health, it was 
reported that up to 10 percent of the UK adult population will experience symp-
toms of depression in any given week and that depression is two to three times 
more common in people with long-term physical health problems. In the hearing 
on education, emphasis was placed on the value of “character building” and “resil-
ience” in the promotion of nonacademic skills and capabilities for students. In the 
hearing on mindfulness and the workplace, the meeting was told that the leading 
cause of workplace sickness absence in the United Kingdom is mental ill health. 
Interest also oriented around the use of mindfulness in the development of higher 
cognitive skills such as working memory functioning and decision making. Execu-
tive control and emotional regulation were also of central concern in the hearing 
on mindfulness and the criminal justice system. Violence in prisons and rates of re-
offense were linked to, but not reduced to, problems in psychological processes and 
states. In the description below, I will draw on events from the hearings on criminal 
justice, the workplace, long-term physical health conditions, and NHS staff. Each 
parliamentary hearing was specifically targeted to address an area in which high 
levels of mental health diagnoses, stress, or anxiety had been identified. Each fol-
lowed a similar structure incorporating: participation in a mindfulness practice; 
presentation of statistics on the scale and form of a particular societal problem and 
its economic implications; personal testimonies from people for whom mindful-
ness practice had been radically transformative; the existing evidence for the ef-
ficacy for mindfulness-based interventions in each area; and reports on the imple-
mentation of small-scale mindfulness interventions. 
Hearings were held in large wood-paneled committee rooms in the Houses 
of Parliament, overlooking the Thames. Each of the hearings was full, and I was 
told that it was unusual to have so many ministers present at APPG meetings, and 
even more unusual for them to stay for any length of time. Over the course of the 
hearings, upward of eighty people presented statistics on challenges being faced 
by populations in different areas of UK life, accounts of research on mindfulness, 
their experiences of implementing mindfulness-based courses, and their personal 
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experiences of practice. These people were drawn from different areas of expertise 
and work, and included but were not limited to researchers, civil servants, MPs, 
ex-offenders, probation managers, patients, school children, third-sector officers, 
private sector workers, NHS service commissioners, healthcare professionals, psy-
chologists, and teachers. The orchestration of such a broad and specialist group of 
people was made possible by a clear agenda for the running order and tight time 
keeping by the chair of each meeting (usually a politician). Speakers were encour-
aged to keep to time, usually no more than five to ten minutes. This, and the range 
and volume of information being presented, gave a clear pace to the proceedings. 
Each meeting followed a similar running order: a welcome from the chair; a short 
mindfulness practice; statistics on the range, scale, and character of a problem; an 
overview of research evidence for mindfulness; testimonials from people who had 
benefited from mindfulness; accounts from professionals who had implemented 
mindfulness-based initiatives in their area; discussion around the barriers to adop-
tion of mindfulness in a given area; and an open discussion on coordination and 
next steps.
At the start of each hearing, assembled professionals, MPs, and peers were in-
vited to settle into a short mindfulness practice led by a respected mindfulness 
teacher. As one of the cochairs commented at the hearing on mental health, the 
short mindfulness practice was important because we were there to discuss mind-
fulness, and this ought to be done mindfully. At the APPG on long-term physical 
health conditions and NHS staff, the practice was led by a consultant clinical psy-
chologist and mindfulness teacher from the NHS: 
So, bringing awareness into the body and perhaps noticing the contact 
of the feet on the floor. . . . Feelings of touch, pressure between the body 
and the chair. Now, taking our position in a way that has a quality of 
wakefulness. . . . A sense of dignity. . . . Being present with our experience. 
Choosing whether to close the eyes now or keep them open but with 
a downward gaze. .  .  . Guiding the attention inward. .  . . Noticing the 
thoughts or images running through the mind. .  . . What feelings are 
around for you? What’s the emotional tone, if you will? . . . What sensations 
are presenting themselves in the body? . . . Not trying to change anything 
here, just tuning in to what’s here for you. . . . And now, narrowing the 
focus of attention to the sensations of the breath in the body. . . . Noticing 
the movement of the breath, coming up close to these sensations and 
recognizing them. . . . Noticing the breath moving in the abdomen. . . . 
Stretching and relaxing back the muscles of the abdomen as you breathe. 
. . . Following the in-breath for its full duration. . . . And the out-breath 
for its full duration. . . . Allowing the breath to be natural, not trying to 
change it or control it. . . . Being with these breath sensations. . . . Noticing 
how the mind moves off into thinking, guiding it back to find the breath 
once again. .  .  . And now expanding awareness around the breath to 
include a sense of the body as a whole. . . . Noticing subtle movements 
throughout the whole body. .  .  . Opening up to felt experience in the 
whole of the body right now. . . . Noticing the shape of the body and the 
space it takes up. . . . The boundary of the body in the environment. . . . 
Noticing sensations of clothes against the skin. . . . Expanding awareness 
beyond the body now to include a sense of the environment, perhaps 
2016 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (1): 141–161
Joanna Cook 154
noticing the temperature, the feeling of air against the skin. . . . Noticing 
sounds. . . . Being aware of the room. And if eyes are closed, beginning to 
open them, bringing awareness to what is seen. . . . Being in this room, 
sitting together. . . . And carrying this awareness into the next moments 
of our being together.
Participation in the mindfulness practice changed the feeling of the hearing sig-
nificantly. Each time, the bustle of arrival gave way to a quieter and more focused 
sense of engagement. Each hearing then continued with the presentation of statis-
tics identifying the character and scale of the problem that was to be considered 
that day. For example, at the hearing on criminal justice, statistics collected by the 
prison reform trust revealed that nearly half the prison population suffer from de-
pression or anxiety (Ministry of Justice 2013) and the suicide rate is almost fifteen 
times higher than in the general population (Department of Health 2004; Samari-
tans resource pack 2004). At the hearing on mindfulness and the workplace, it was 
reported that since 2009 the number of sick days lost to stress, depression, and 
anxiety has increased by 24 percent (Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer 
2013). 
An autobiographical narrative then followed from someone for whom the 
problems identified in the hearing were personally relevant and who had benefited 
from mindfulness. Here, the value of mindfulness extended much further than the 
problems presented statistically (such as absenteeism, recidivism, burnout, chronic 
pain, etc.). Mindfulness was presented as having had a profound and transforma-
tive effect on the speaker. For example, an ex-offender told the hearing on criminal 
justice of his previously troubled life, his discovery of mindfulness, and how much 
he had been affected by this. Preventing reoffense was implicit in his account, but he 
placed emphasis on his overall experience of life and his relationships with others: 
I was diagnosed with PTSD [posttraumatic stress disorder] when I was 
five. My carers were violent. I didn’t know what was happening. If you 
grow up in a war zone, you become a warrior. I got into alcohol and 
drugs. I ended up in prison. I had regret for the past and fear for the 
future. I was robbed of the present, and mindfulness gave that back. It’s 
revolutionized my way of seeing the world and myself. My kids have 
never seen me violent and I’m trying to teach them through mindfulness. 
You have to try it. As they say in Glasgow, “Better felt than telt.” I could 
tell you about all the miracles in my life, but you have to go out and taste 
it for yourself. Five years ago I was in a homeless shelter and now I’m 
sitting in Parliament. 
Similarly, at the hearing on mindfulness and the NHS, an Accident & Emergency 
mental health nurse who works nights and has two teenage sons reported that she 
joined a mindfulness course at work out of curiosity and that it had a radical im-
pact on her life: 
It’s been quite life changing for me. I found quite quickly that my thought 
processes changed and I hadn’t realized that maybe I had got quite bogged 
down in things; I just thought it was the passage of life and it takes its toll 
on everyone. You know, we all have bereavements, we all have losses, 
things go wrong in our lives. During the course, I was just like my old 
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self, just like when I was a lot younger. I was happy, I was feeling joy in 
things, and I hadn’t realized that that part of my life had gone. 
Testimonials were then followed by econometric data on the forecasted cost of 
mental health problems to the state, and a presentation of the quantitative evi-
dence for the efficacy of mindfulness as a targeted intervention to address specific 
problems. This was followed by accounts from professionals who had introduced 
mindfulness-based interventions in their given field and the challenges that they 
had encountered. At the hearing on criminal justice, a senior representative for 
the Welsh probation service presented her experience of running a mindfulness 
pilot project in a probation hospital in Cardiff. This was conducted with two high-
risk sexual offenders and one high-risk violent offender, all of whom had spent 
at least five years in prison. Simultaneously highlighting economic efficiency and 
personal transformation, she presented a case study of a violent offender who had 
used mindfulness to control his impulse to commit a violent act. He had witnessed 
a young man being disrespectful to an older lady at a bus stop and was immediately 
awash with powerful fantasies of violence. He vividly imagined putting the young 
man’s head through the screen of the bus shelter, to the extent that he heard the 
glass breaking and smelt the blood. At the same time, however, he heard his mind-
fulness teacher’s voice in his head, saying, “Notice what is happening right now. 
Move towards the positive.” The probation executive told the hearing, “He was able 
to witness the thoughts in a nonjudgmental way, and allow them to pass without 
reacting to them and being violent. We costed up that scenario and found that it 
would have cost £100,000 in services if he had followed through on that impulse.” 
By collecting together sets of evidence the breadth and character of different 
problems were represented at different scales (personal, societal, epidemiological, 
and professional). Mental health issues were framed as sharing a common iden-
tity and as being unique to each domain. This enabled the range and character of 
challenges experienced by different groups of people to be discussed without the 
differences between them being elided. Maintaining this multiplicity of meaning 
and the breadth and specialism of the contributors was understood to mark the 
success of the inquiry process and the drafting of the inquiry report. Participants 
identified diverse societal problems, and the inquiry process was intended to ex-
plore the evidence and potential for mindfulness-based interventions in addressing 
them. In the course of this process, mindfulness was understood through different 
frameworks. This shifting ground—the meaning of mindfulness, and the range of 
problems that were under consideration—was held together through the structure 
of the inquiry process itself. That is, while the “meaning” of mindfulness was mul-
tiple and the populations and problems were diverse, the pattern and sequence of 
the process created coherence between seemingly very different scales and orders 
of issues. This did not flatten diversity but, rather, enabled it. 
Conclusion 
In her ethnography of UN-sponsored international conferences, Riles (1998) ex-
plores the challenge that negotiators face in holding multiple levels of action in 
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view at once. She asks, how does institutional knowledge achieve its effects, and 
what effects does it achieve? She argues that the production and ratification of in-
tergovernmental agreements involve nonrepresentational patterning. In focusing 
on the aesthetic form to which information in documents adheres, rather than the 
meaning of information, she is able to consider “the way that the form of the docu-
ments made manifest a reality of levels and levels of realities” (ibid.: 379). Similarly, 
standardization in the inquiry process brought together multiple levels of reality—
the scale changing of statistics and personal testimonies, for example—and also 
multiple realities—the experiences of people in diverse parts of civil society deal-
ing with different problems. The overall aesthetic of the process enabled multiple 
meanings of mindfulness and societal problems to be considered in one coherent 
endeavor. 
The inquiry process was constituted through the orchestrated dialogue of a di-
verse and professionalized group of people rather than a “top-down” implementa-
tion of “big policy.” Throughout the inquiry process and the drafting of the report, 
social problems from disparate areas of civil society were collected together. This 
multiplicity of meaning was maintained through the development and enforce-
ment of a clear pattern of procedures, which enabled the representation of multiple 
levels of reality within and across each focus. This ensured integrity of approach in 
the presence of diversity of meaning. The narrower focuses of each hearing (such 
as preventing depressive relapse or improving students’ attentional control) were 
contained within the standardization of the proceedings. The development of the 
inquiry process required methods for creating reliability of information across do-
mains, agreed methods of gathering information, and some sense of integrity (of 
data, evidence, and recommendations) that stretched across local contingencies, 
interpretations, and meanings. Both scales of information and the framing of men-
tal health issues remained multiple throughout the process. The aesthetic of the in-
quiry acted as a container allowing for multiple meanings of mindfulness without 
demanding consensus. 
I have argued that an analysis of self-governance as a neoliberal tool risks in-
terpreting “responsibilization” through a totalizing framework: practices of self-
governance are read as individualizing and psychologizing suffering, and there-
by obfuscating the social and political causes of mental health issues at a time of 
increasing social welfare cuts. But this leaves analysis of governance limited to a 
framework of top-down intervention and does not account for diversity in the 
motivations, experiences, and efforts of people practicing self-governance and the 
collaborative nature of the political processes by which it is promoted. Self-gov-
ernance, then, becomes a mask for austerity. I have suggested that it is possible to 
identify the limits of neoliberalism by resisting the temptation to move beyond the 
ethnographic movement. In so doing, the motor of political process is revealed to 
be the maintenance of a diversity of meanings of self-governance. 
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Pleine Conscience à Westminster: Politique de la méditation et les limites 
de la critique néolibérale
Résumé : Le concept de néolibéralisme rend compte de la relation entre des formes 
de gouvernance, des formes d’auto-gestion, et les forces du marché capitaliste. Mais 
comment établir ses limites? En m’intéressant au concept de mindfulness avec une 
étude ethnographique, j’explore les catégories théoriques du néolibéralisme et de 
la “responsabilisation” qui traversent les formes émergentes de gouvernance de 
la société britannique contemporaine. J’ai choisi ce sujet pour ma recherche afin 
d’étudier les multiples sens et valeurs investis dans les pratiques de subjectivation, 
et les façons dont une diversité est maintenue à travers la structure de l’enquête 
politique. Je montre que les pratiques de subiectivation ne sont jamais totalisantes. 
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Les préoccupations politico-économiques demeurent centrales aux intérêts pro-
fessionnels dans l’auto-gestion, et les pratiques de subiectivation peuvent avoir de 
nombreux et divers sens: le maintien de cette variété est le moteur du processus 
politique.
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